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This paper examines the sources of investment financing for the 
Business Sector in South Korea during the time period 1980-1997. 
The aim to do this is to answer some questions that are relevant 
within the debate on the causes of the financial and exchange rate 
crisis of 1997-1998. Why is corporate debt in these countries so 
high in comparison to that of western countries? Is the share of 
bank debt over the total sources of finance too high and thus needs 
to be reduced? What are the effects of the liberalization and 
deregulation process on the financial structure of the corporate 
sector?  
These questions are in part related to the debate on the causes of the 
financial and exchange rate crisis of 1997-1998, since the high debt 
of both banks and firms has been included in the list of 'wrong' 
fundamentals, that would have induced investors to withdraw 
capitals from these countries. The liberalization process would have 
favoured the accumulation of debt, either because of the implicit 
assumption of a rescue by the State in case of trouble or the 
increase in the supply of credit through the openness to 
international markets. As a matter of fact, the circumstance that 
fuelled the crisis was the inability to meet payments obligations 
related to loans contracted in foreign currency. 
The empirical work shows that the expansion of internal capital 
markets, favoured by the liberalization process, has contributed to 
the high indebtedness of firms, whose financial structure has 
changed at least three times during the time interval considered. 
We can describe three periods, each with a different financial 
structure, in this time span. We find empirical evidence that the 
accumulation of debt was due to both the financing of investment 
and the acquisition of financial assets.   
The second section deals with the debate on what caused the 




the debate on what causes the high leverage of firms. The fourth 
provides evidence on the net financing proportions of investment 
for the Korean Business Sector over the period 1980-1997. The 
fifth section deals with the relation between sources and 
investment, the sixth explains why the liberalization process may 
have caused the growth in firms uses. The seventh concludes. 
 
 
2 The debate on the causes of the financial and exchange rate 
crisis of 1997-1998. 
  
There are two main competing explanations of the financial and 
exchange rate crisis of 1997-1998. The first focuses on disturbances 
on the real side of the economies hurt by the crisis such as current 
account disequilibria, bad balance sheets of firms and banks. The 
second explanation focuses on financial factors and expectations 
and describes the crisis as a speculative bubble based on 
expectations, not related to the state of fundamentals, that has 
proved to be self-fulfilling. 
Both schools of thought agree that the most important factor in the 
crisis was the withdrawal of foreign capitals that had flown until 
then to a great extent from foreign countries. According to the first 
story, however, the capitals had been withdrawn because the 
fundamentals of these countries were in such a bad shape that the 
creditors had serious doubts on the solvency of the debtors. Their 
decision would then be rational and based on fundamentals. The 
crisis should then be interpreted as the explosion of structural 
distortions and wrong policies that had weakened the economies of 
these countries for many years. To prove this thesis various 
economic indicators are examined such as current account 
imbalances, foreign debt, bad conditions of firms and financial 
systems. As to the current account imbalances one relevant 
circumstance is that the countries, that suffered the worst exchange 
rates crises, had for many years ahead during the Nineties big 




in the ranged 2-8%. According to this view, financial markets may 
have overreacted so that the loss in value of currencies and financial 
activities may have been excessive, but the main point in this 
explanation are still the bad conditions of fundamentals that 
triggered the funds withdrawal. 
The second story focuses instead on the contagion mechanism, 
which caused the spreading of a small financial disturbance over 
the region, thus bringing many solvent but illiquid economic units 
into bankruptcy. The crisis was a terrible run on the banks to get 
back the money deposited, nourished by loss of confidence and 
panic. The crisis, started in Thailand, spread, thanks to this 
mechanism, to all countries of the area causing a chain of exchange 
rate and stock markets crashes, motivated by purely psychological 
factors. (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Furman and Stiglitz 1998). 
The proponents of this story agree that those economies had 
some structural problems but argue that the crisis is too violent 
and pervasive to be considered the consequence of these 
structural problems. They acknowledge that excessive 
investment, high foreign debt and high leverage of both firms 
and financial institutions had weakened these countries but add 
that, all this nothwithstanding, they had reached in short time a 
good level of economic development. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) 
argue that it is very difficult to find a set of economic indicators 
that can be used as crisis predictors for all the countries 
considered. Though all of them had some structural problems, 
some of them had big and long-lasting current account 
imbalances without having high leverage of firms and banks, 
some of them had only a small and recent current account 
imbalance but a bubble in the price of financial activities and so 
on. More important, even if such a set of economic indicators 
could be accepted as crisis predictors it would remain 
unexplained why other countries that, according to this theory, 
should have experienced a crisis did not and were totally 




The high leverages of both firms and financial institutions are 
often mentioned among the factors behind the crisis. Some argue 
that such high leverages are the result of a local form of capitalism 
based on corruption and state intervention to protect the interests of 
some influential business groups. Liberalization would have 
fostered speculative activities by both firms and banks without 
caring at mounting debt because of the implicit support of the state 
and of international financial institutions in case of trouble. It would 
then be a case of moral hazard (see Krugman 1998, Sachs1997).  
The proponents of the second story argue that moral hazard is a 
problem that any financial system must face when the possibility of 
contagion is taken into account; therefore that is no peculiar feature of 
the economic systems of East Asian countries (see Furman and Stiglitz 
1998). High leverage may be explained with other peculiar features of 
the countries considered, such as the high investment rates and the lack 
of alternative sources of financing for firms. In order to avoid such 
problems in the future it would be appropriate to strengthen the 
financial system and to foster the expansion of capital markets that 
could offer funds to firms (see World Bank 1998). 
To both views liberalization may be a good thing, but without 
corruption and state intervention to the first and only under certain 
conditions, such as a well regulated and healthy financial system, to 
the second. To the latter the expansion of capital markets would be 
a decisive step to strengthen the structure of financial markets and 
would mitigate the debt problems of firms by opening new 
financing possibilities different from bank debt.  
The aim of this work is to explain the reasons behind the accumulation 
of debt in the business sector in South Korea in the Nineties and to 
assess whether the high leverages of the period preceding the crisis 
depended upon the same set of factors as in the past decades. The author 
finds empirical evidence that the liberalization process has favoured the 
persistence of high debt in the business sector. The reasons behind this, 
however, are different from those mentioned in the above quoted 
literature. To some the rising indebtedness was due to a moral hazard 




firms to ask for debts they knew they could not give back. To others it 
was due to the high investment and to the insufficient expansion of 
capital markets that could have helped in replacing bank debt as a means 
of financing. To the former, liberalization was introduced in wild 
markets and thus created wrong incentives. To the latter, financial 
markets are imperfect everywhere, not only in these countries, 
particularly markets for bank debt because of informational 
asymmetries. Therefore it would be useful to reduce the dependence of 
firms on bank debt, though for informational imperfections the 
possibility of raising equity capital is subject to some limits, both in 
developed and in developing countries. (see Stiglitz 1998) 
This work finds evidence that the liberalization process favoured 
the accumulation of business sector debt towards all 
counterparties, not only the banks and the financial institutions. 
Most of this debt was due to other counterparties, which means that 
it is was directly placed on the market. Therefore it was the rapid 
expansion of capital markets rather than their absence or thinness 
to have favoured the accumulation of debt. Moreover the expansion 
of a specific section of these markets, the market for short term debt 
instruments, issued by firms underwritten by banks and other 
financial institutions and sold on the market, is responsible for the 
contagion since it created a dense web of credits, whose risks were 
correlated over the whole area. The interdependence of credit risks 
is the major contagion factor. One does not need to resort to either 
structural or psychological problems to explain contagion (see 
International Monetary Fund 1998 for a vivid description of the 
working of capital markets in these countries). 
One could ask why firms did not use more stocks rather than these 
instruments. One explanation could be the high volatility of the 
prices of stocks in these markets.  
Liberalization has affected both banks and firms. The bad situation 
of banks were due not only to the nonperforming loans problem but 
also to the fall in the value of stocks that hurt the bank balance 
sheets. In the past banks were obviously hurt by shocks to the firms 




rather than the price of equity channel. In the situation before the 
crisis banks held substantial shares of stocks in their portfolios. The 
problems of firms thus hurt them through both these channels.
1 
It was the increase in credit availability that increased the demand 
of firms who used the funds, as we shall see in the next sections, 
both for investment financing and acquisition of financial activities. 
In the first phase of liberalization the stock market became an 
important source of funds for firms (it covered around 25% of net 
investment financing). This happy state of things lasted just for a 
few years. Thereafter debt rose again and also financial assets. The 
fluctuation of leverage is due not only to the debt, which lies on the 
numerator, but also to the value of equity, which lies on the 
denominator. After this short expansion in the stock market, the 
price of equity fell and fluctuated quite a lot. 
 
 
3The debate on why firms have high leverages. 
 
There is a debate on corporate leverage that dates before the crisis and 
is mainly related to the difference in financial structures across 
countries or more generally economic systems; the reasons underlying 
the difference in corporate leverage between western countries and 
eastern countries have been often debated and within this subject a 
particular place is assigned to the Japanese case compared to US, UK 
or European countries. The most accepted explanation of the high 
leverage of corporations in Japan has been given by Aoki (see Aoki 
1989) High leverage in this case would depend upon the institutional 
environment and upon the type of corporate governance that rules in 
this country; the task that banks perform as monitors of the firms is 
important in this respect. The deviation from the maximization of the 
price of shares, that seems common practice in this country, is related 
to the power of banks; they can influence the choice of the managers of 
the firms making them inclined towards a financial structure where 
                                                 




bank debt has a bigger weight than that compatible with share price 
maximization. 
   
Another reason why corporate leverages in Japan are so high is that 
firms use to hold a lot of short term bank liabilities in their balance 
sheets. This happens because banks ask them to hold part of the 
loans granted on their accounts as compensating balances. In 
practice they are required to redeposit part of the money borrowed 
at the bank. Moreover it has been noticed that Japanese firms use to 
hold a great amount of short term financial assets within which also 
a relevant share of trade credits while having on the other side 
many short term debts. The ratio of short term financial assets plus 
trade credit to value added of Japanese firms is high (200%) and 
bigger than that of firms in UK, US, and Germany (see Prevezer 
and Ricketts 1994 p.255)  
This explanation loses strength if applied to other Eastern countries 
such as South Korea. In this country, banks are less powerful than 
in Japan since they are mainly executors of decisions taken by the 
government. There is a sort of "main bank"; yet the influence that 
Japanese banks have on managers' investment and financing 
decisions is hardly conceivable in this institutional environment. 
Moreover, as the liberalization and deregulation process went on, 
their influence declined even more.  
To others the reasons behind the high leverage cannot be found in 
microeconomic theories of the firm, but in national accounts data. 
One strand of literature is dealing with the difference in investment 
rates. Since investment rates in Eastern countries are much higher 
than in Western countries the need for funds to finance investment 
is much bigger. Given that in almost all countries capital markets 
do not contribute a lot to this financing (on this see Mayer 1990 and 
Mayer 1992), the dependence on bank debt is obvious.  
There is also another macroeconomic explanation, based on the fact 
that in these countries both investment and saving rates are very high 
(see Wade and Veneroso 1998 and Wade 1990). The starting point for 




also very high and higher than in Europe and in the States. Since 
households save a lot and deposit these savings at the banks the ratio of 
deposits to GDP is also very high. Being both families and states very 
cautious in borrowing, the only sector that borrows from banks is the 
business sector. (see Wade and Veneroso 1998 p.6) Essential to this 
view is that markets for other instruments to allocate savings do not 
exist or are scarcely developed. This explains why savings either are 
held as idle balances or are deposited at banks. The disadvantage of 
such a state of things is that firms, being loaded with debts, are very 
sensitive both to interest rate rises and to credit supply or income 
shocks. Corporate sector financial fragility would depend therefore 
upon the ratio of bank deposits to GDP on one hand and on the 
leverage (ratio corporate debt to equity) on the other.
2  
The high leverage of firms would then depend on the type of 
industrial development that has established itself in these countries 
whose main features are both a high rate of investment and a high 
rate of saving without capital markets. This model works only if 
shocks to interest rates and firms income occur rarely and are not 
too big. Otherwise many firms would be compelled to go into 
bankruptcy. A critical assumption of this view is that firms finance 
their investment exclusively by means of bank credit and that banks 
are the only intermediaries to receive households savings. Changing 
the way firms finance their investment in order to lower their 
leverage would also mean to throw away this development model.  
The same conclusion has been drawn by reports and scientific 
articles written by members of international institutions or directly 
published by them (World Bank, IMF). The judgement behind this 
common conclusion may be different, since those international 
institutions foster deep changes inside these economic systems that 
would make them more similar to the Western economies.  
                                                 
2 "The deeper the intermediation of debt (that is, the higher the ratio of 
bank deposits to GDP and the higher the ratio of corporate debt to equity), 
the more likely that any depressive shock will cause illiquidity, default and 




The analysis of the rationale for high debt may also be similar to 
that of Wade and Veneroso (1998). Claessens et. al. (1998) write 
that "the combination of high investment and relatively low 
profitability in some countries meant that much external financing 
was needed. As outside equity was used sparingly, leverage was 
high in most East Asian countries." In a study published by the 
World Bank we read that firms, because of the absence of markets 
for stocks and bonds, borrowed too much from banks in order to 
finance their rapid expansion. Therefore they had a high leverage 
(World Bank 1998 p.xiv). 
Both the supporters of this development model and those who urge 
for a drastic change, agree that one of its essential features is the 
dependence of firms on bank debt, that raises leverage. Both parties 
agree also that the expansion of capital markets according to the 
Anglo-Saxon model would lower the leverage, though it would also 
stop this development model. A hidden assumption in this line of 
thought is that high leverage in the 1990s and particularly in the 
years before the crisis can be explained in the same way as that of 
the preceding decades. Thus the deep change that the financial 
markets of the countries hurt by the crisis have experienced during 
the liberalization process is completely neglected. Another missing 
point is that, though leverage may be high because corporate debt 
is high, corporate debt includes not only bank credit but also 
credits of other counterparties. Debt directly placed on the market, 
such as bonds and credit securities, raises the numerator of the ratio 
as well. The denominator, the value of equity, is also neglected in 
this analysis. Stock market booms and busts that change the value 
of equity may give the impression of artificially high or low 
leverage. Since most of these countries experienced a high volatility 
in the price of financial assets, this is reflected in the calculation of 
the ratio. In the old state of things, being financial markets 
underdeveloped, volatility was no matter of concern for firms and 
changes in the leverage were mostly related to changes in debts and 




their income. Thus changes on the real side of the economy were 
the most important factor. 
In order to assess which kind of debt was responsible for the high 
indebtedness of firms, this work examines empirically the sources of 
investment finance for firms during the time period 1980-1997. The 
choice of such a long time span will allow us to answer the question 
on the persistence of the same financial structure over the whole 
period considered, being this the main assumption of the literature 
on this subject.   
Another question that calls for an answer is whether the assumption 
of a strong correlation of debt and investment holds; and, even if it 
holds, whether the debt was raised exclusively to finance investment 
or both to invest and to buy financial assets.  
 
 
4 The sources of investment finance 1980-1997. 
 
4. 1 Sources and Uses of the Business Sector.  
 
In this section we look at the data on the stocks of corporate sector 
sources and uses (Flow of Funds, Total of Financial transactions). We 
measure all series in terms of GDP. Graph 1 shows that in the 
subperiod 1980-1989 the sources fluctuate around a constant whereas 
the uses show a steady, though weak, growth. In the subperiod 1989-
1997 both sources and uses show a strong growth.  
In the first subperiod, the fluctuations of sources may be related to 
the substitution of external funds with internally generated funds, 
particularly in the years 1985-1988. This, in turn, may be due to the 
good business cycle phase. In the second subperiod, instead, both 
sources and uses grow steadily independently of business cycles 
phases. This would suggest that in this subperiod no substitution 
between external funds and internally generated funds has been 
made by firms, even during good times. Instead the most striking 
feature of this period is that both sources and uses have the same 


















Since this evolution may be affected by the fluctuations in GDP, we 
performed the same operation using both sources and uses at 
constant prices (GDP deflator) and divided them by the stock of 





























Graph 2 shows that both sources and uses grow over the whole 
period, as it could be expected, but the rate of growth is greater in 
the last years. Since the capital stock increases strongly in the same 
period, the rising ratio of sources to capital stock implies that the 
sources rise more than the capital stock (see graph 7). 
 
4.2 Net financing proportions of investment over the period 
1980-1997.  
 
In this section we will calculate net financing proportions for 
investment
3 during the period 1980-1997. We follow Mayer (Mayer 
1990 p.329) in considering the proportions on a net basis. This 
means that acquisitions of financial assets are subtracted from 
increases in corresponding liabilities. 
                                                 




Our proportions tell us how year by year investment on a gross 
basis has been financed. Both financing sources and investment are 
taken at current prices. 
 
The patterns of financing that emerge as a result of these 
calculations are at least three. 
In the first subperiod 1980-1985 the prevailing sources of financing 
are bank credit, own financing and a mix of sources which include 
trade credit and financing from abroad. External financing on the 
market is virtually nonexistent.  
In the second subperiod 1985-1989 the picture drastically changes 
insofar as own financing and new issues of shares become the most 
important sources of financing. The increase in new issues can be 
explained by the boom in the stock exchange and the high price of 
shares. 
In the third subperiod 1989-1997 we notice a strong reduction in 
the own financing proportions and a big rise in the proportions of 
securities (both long term and short term). Though the proportion 
of securities rises, the proportion of stocks falls with respect to the 
period 1985-1989. This may be related to the fall in the stock index 
after the boom period.  
In order to assess the main patterns of financing in graph 3 we 
consider only three net sources: own financing, loans and securities. 
In the latter item we aggregate both securities and stocks.
4 We do 
not consider minor items such as trade credit in this preliminary 
evidence.
5 
This rough division may enable us to assess the contribution of the 
market for securities to the financing of investment. Thus we see 
that the item securities proportion shows a positive trend rising 
                                                 
4 The effective proportion of securities is thus underestimated since the 
share of securities in the minor items that are omitted is not taken into 
consideration. 





from the value of 0.2 in 1980 to the value of near 0.5 in 1996 (just 
before the crisis broke). 
 
 


















As shown by graph 3 we see that, in the period 1980-1988, the net 
proportions of own financing and loans are inversely correlated. 
This pattern may be explained by the absence of developed market 
for securities so that the two sources were the major alternative 
choices among financing means. In 1987 the decline in loans is so 
strong that the loans proportion becomes equal to that of securities. 
From 1988 onwards both securities and loans show a rising trend 
whereas own financing stabilizes at a much lower level than in the 
preceding period. This can be observed by looking at table 1, which 
shows the correlation coefficients that are calculated separately for 
the two subperiods 1980-1988 and 1989-1997. In the first subperiod 




negative whereas in the second is slightly positive. The correlation 
coefficient for loans and securities is negative in both periods and 
almost equal in absolute value. We shall remember however that 
these are net loans. 
 
 







a own financing proportion, b loans proportion, c total securities 
proportion. 
 
A comparison with the findings of Mayer’s work (see Mayer 1990) 
on the international financing of industry shows that the pattern of 
financing that prevailed in the period 1980-1988 is similar to that 
observed in the majority of countries included in this study. The 
own financing proportion is quite high and also in the sample 
studied by Mayer this is the major source of finance for companies 
ranging from 61.4 for France to 102.4 for the United Kingdom in 
the period 1970-1985. (see Mayer 1990 p.310 table 12.1) 
In particular the two main findings of Mayer’s study, namely that 
retentions are the dominant source of finance in all countries and 
that in no country companies raise a substantial amount of finance 
from securities markets may apply to South Korea as well in 








-0.75 0.053 -0.56 1980-
1988 





the1980s. The rationale behind the last observation may be 
different. In the United Kingdom where the markets for securities 
were highly developed the observed pattern of finance could have 
been a voluntary choice whereas in South Korea it could have been 
a matter of necessity. The difference between bank based and 
market based systems does not emerge in relation to the proportion 
of securities, being this proportion low even in market based 
systems such as the United Kingdom. The difference arises in the 
proportion of loans in the financing of investment which is very low 
in the United Kingdom and in The United States, while it is quite 
high in France, Japan and Italy. Another feature of company 
finance that results from Mayer’s work is that there is a strong 
inverse relation between the proportion of expenditure financed 
from retentions and bank credit. (see Mayer 1990 p.315) Even this 
applies well to the case studied here for the first subperiod, being 
the correlation coefficient between own financing and loans 
proportions both negative and high in absolute value –0.75. In short 
almost all countries do not use securities as an important source of 
finance; the countries more bank-based use a mix of retentions and 
credit with a higher proportion of credit; the countries that are 
generally considered more market-based use a mix of the two 
sources, where the bank credit proportion is very low. 
The pattern of financing that prevailed in South Korea in the 
subperiod 1989-1997 diverges from both models. The share of 
securities is high and reaches almost 50% at the end of the period, 
the share of own financing is low and declining over the whole 
period, the share of net loans is low and declining, though the same 
does not hold for gross loans. Thus the high securities and low own 
financing proportions are in striking contrast to the pattern 
prevailing in the major industrialized countries. If we consider only 
the net proportions of financing investment it could be argued that 
the financial system under the pressure of liberalization was 
evolving towards a more market based system where the share of 
loans in financing declines, the importance of banks being also in a 




market-based system would be that the external indebtedness of 
firms would decline and thus their leverage, the relation between 
debt and equity would tend to diminish. This would be a great 
advantage especially in countries where firms start from a situation 
of high leverage. Unfortunately this is not the case in South Korea. 
The declining share of net loans reflects just the opposite side of the 
firms balance sheet, that is, the net position has improved but a 
large amount of debt is still demanded and obtained by firms. The 
net position is just the difference between liabilities to banks and 
claims on banks; what happened is that the former did not decline 
with respect to the preceding subperiod, on the contrary the latter 





The proportion of investment financed by loans on a gross basis has 
therefore not decreased. According to these data it appears difficult 
to support the claim that excessive leverage may be caused by high 















proportion decline in favour of an increase in the amount of loans 
(see World Bank 1998). We have already seen that own financing 
and loans proportions are not inversely correlated in the second 
subperiod as this argument would imply. Over the whole period it 
seems that the sum of own financing and loans proportions is 
inversely correlated to the total securities proportion, as it is clear 
from graph 5.  
 
 
Graph 5: A comparison between ownfinancing plus loans 












1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
ownfinloans
securities
   
  
From these data the change in the pattern of financing reflects the 
substitution of own financing for securities letting almost 
unchanged the gross proportion of loans. In the set of securities the 
proportion of equity was not high. Therefore the leverage ratio did 
not decline as it should be expected if the flow of new securities 
had replaced bank credit. On the contrary the liabilities increased 




from the banks. In graph 6 we see the net financing proportion of 




















Stocks are important only in the period 1986-1989, in the years 
after 1989 they decline and in 1997 they are at the same level as in 
1985. The increase in the total sum of liabilities is one of the 
reasons why the balance sheets of firms worsened during the 1990s. 
The result of the financial liberalization was therefore the tendency 
to raise more capital both on the markets and from intermediaries, 
which increased the debt burden. In the three years preceding the 
crisis the share of short term securities over total securities has 
















5 Is there a statistically significant relation between sources 
and investment?  
 
 In this section we will assess the effect of the increase in the ratio of 
sources relative to GDP as flow entities on the investment. In practice 
we are dividing both sources and investment with GDP. In particular 
this relation is examined during the period of liberalization which 
started in the middle of the 1980s and continued in the 1990s. The year 
1997 is excluded since it is the year of the crisis therefore it is very 




log(INGDP) = - 0.45





2 = 0.80 
Durbin Watson = 1.44 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The highly significant coefficient (1% level) shows that there has 
been a positive influence of the change in sources on investment, 
both measured with respect to GDP. The value of the coefficient, 
though high 0.44, shows that not all new sources were used to 
finance investment.  
Since the regression is made with flows with respect to GDP, we do 
not have any information on the different speed of accumulation of 
sources, uses and capital stock. Graph 7 compares the pattern of 
growth of these three stock variables measured in real terms. Uses 
and flows are deflated by divided by the GDP deflator, whereas the 





















As we can see from the graph the line representing the 
accumulation of capital stock lies above the line representing the 
accumulation of the funds raised for most of the sample period. At a 
certain point they twist each other, and change their position with 
the sources climbing up whereas the stock of capital lies under their 
line. This can be interpreted as evidence that in the first phase of 
liberalization the removal of financing constraints has made 
possible an increase in investment that has caused an acceleration in 
the growth of the capital stock. This lasts during the period 1985-
1992. Afterwards in the four years preceding the crisis the speed at 
which funds are raised is much higher than the accumulation of 
capital but also the rate of accumulation of financial assets 
increases. This pattern of growth in the last years of the sample 
could be explained by the higher return on financial activities 
relative to the return on capital. The former increased in real terms 




by firms could have been caused by the attempt to improve their 
poor performance in terms of yield on capital.  
 
 
6 The effect of liberalization on the return of bank liabilities. 
 
The aim of this section is to answer the question whether the 
liberalization programme pursued by the authorities has created a 
structure of relative prices such as to favour the investment in financial 
activities, particularly, bank liabilities such as various types of deposits, 
certificates of deposit and other assets issued by banks. 
The stages of the liberalization programme can be summarized as 
follows. In the first phase, starting from November 1991, the 
liberalization concerned the interest on short term large 
denomination deposit instruments, such as CD trade bills 
commercial paper and repurchases, long term time deposits and 
money in trust with a maturity of at least three years. Regarding 
interest on loans, in this first stage, the authorities liberalized the 
interest on bank overdrafts and discounts on commercial bills (with 
the exclusion of loans assisted by BOK rediscounts) discounts of 
commercial paper and trade bills of investment and finance 
companies. Thus, in this first stage, a large amount of bank 
liabilities (trust accounts amount to a big share of the market in this 
country) had their yield liberalized, whereas most of the bank 
assets, namely loans, were still subject to regulations. Thus banks 
were subject to the competition on the interest paid on their 
liabilities without being allowed to raise the interest on their assets, 
the loans. The interest rate on loans of all bank and non bank 
financial institutions had to be liberalized in the second stage 
starting from December 1993 but the liberalization was delayed 
because of the problems of firms. On the side of bank liabilities this 
second stage foresaw the liberalization of the interest paid on 
deposits with maturity longer than two years. In the third stage the 
loans financed by BOK rediscounts and the special purpose loans 




One part of the story is that this lowered interest margins for banks 
whereas it gave impulse to the growth of various markets for short 
term debt and it increased the weight of trust accounts in portfolios. 
The other part of the story is that real yield on financial activities 
rose enormously in comparison to the what happened in the 
previous decades where the return on deposits was either negative 
in real terms or mildly positive. From data on the real interest on 
deposits (see Bank of Korea Research Paper 1994) we see that the 
real return was positive in the 1960s, negative in the 1970s and 
slightly positive in the 1980s (the mean return over the period 1970-
1980 for a one year deposit was around 3.45) 
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (1997) argue that the capital 
markets in these countries during the industrialization period were 
an example of a "financial restraint" regime as opposed to that of 
financial repression. In the former case real yield on deposits are 
positive and the rent that results from the deviation from market 
conditions is not taken by the state but redistributed from 
households to firms. In fact the first observation does not apply to 
South Korea since real yield on deposits were for most of the time 
negative in real terms, whereas the second factor regarding the 
redistribution of the rent may apply to this case. 
 
Financial innovation provided many new instruments to allocate 
savings that were not available in the previous decades and which 





Table 2: The return in real terms (nominal yield minus GDP 
deflator) of various financial assets. 
 
 
  a b c d 
1992    7.7  10.4  10.4  7.01 
1993    7.2  8.1  10.2        6.7-7.7 
1994    5.4  6.8  7.4        4.4-5.4 
1995  7.4  9.2  9.5        5.1-7.1 
1996 7.3  7.7  8.6  5.91 
1997 7.6  8.5  8.4  8.61 






a= money in trust (corporations) 
b= cash management accounts 
c= Mutual Saving and Finance Companies 2 years or more time  
     deposits 
d= bank deposits (three years less than four) 
Note: for the item d in the years 1993-95 the values are given 
within a certain range since the authorities allowed them to 
fluctuate within this range. 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1998,The Bank of Korea 
for the nominal yield. Calculations of real returns are made by  





Graph 8 shows that, on the side of firms, the rate of return on own 
capital declined steadily from 1987 to 1993 going up shortly 
afterwards and falling again in 1995. 
 
 






Thus there is a strong difference in the performance of investment 
in real activities and performance of investment in financial 
activities particularly bank liabilities. We see in graph 9 that the 
return on shares after the stock market boom in the late 1980s 
declined in the 1990s and was very low in the two years preceding 
the crisis. 
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 The difference in the yield of investment and of monetary activities 
did not cause a reduction of the accumulation of capital, a substitution 
of real assets with financial assets as it could be expected. Investment 
grew at very high speed (see section 5 for data on this). A possible 
explanation of the accumulation of monetary assets in the balance 
sheets of firms is that this practice was a way to compensate the low 





From the empirical findings of this work one can conclude that 
indeed the liberalization process, started in 1985, played a role in 




instruments on both the liabilities and the assets side had different 
effects during the different periods considered. 
In the first period 1980-1985 the prevailing sources of financing are 
bank credit, own financing and a mix of sources which include 
trade credit and financing from abroad. External financing on the 
market is virtually nonexistent. In the second period 1985-1989, the 
picture drastically changes in that own financing and new issues of 
shares become the most important sources of financing. The 
increase in new issues can be explained by the boom in the stock 
exchange and the high price of shares. In the third period 1989-
1997 we notice a big reduction in the own financing proportions 
and a strong rise in the proportions of securities (both long term and 
short term). Though the proportion of securities rises, the 
proportion of stocks falls relative to the period 1985-1989. This 
may be related to the fall in the stock index after the boom period. 
In the second period considered, firms reduced their indebtedness 
(as can be seen from the financing proportions) and replaced debt 
with shares and own financing. Thereafter their indebtedness 
increased towards banks, non bank financial institutions and 
towards other counterparts. Most of this new debt was in the form 
of securities, the most part was short term. Another question we 
asked was why firms raised so much external finance. We found 
that over the period 1985-1996 there is a significant and relevant 
effect of the sources on investment (both in terms of GDP). This 
means that a relevant part of the funds raised were used for 
investment, though not all of them. On the other hand we see from 
stock data that in the 1990s the growth of firms assets with respect 
to GDP and with respect to the stock of capital accelerated too. 
From the net proportions of financing calculated in section 4 we 
saw that the gross proportion of loans did not decline whereas the 
net proportion did. This is due to the accumulation in firms 
portfolios of financial assets issued by banks and other non bank 
financial institutions. We saw that the reason behind this choice 




the period considered, both in absolute value and relative to the 
real return on capital, which was particularly low in the 1990s. 
Regarding the debate on the causes of the financial crisis in 1997 
this study finds that, on the one hand, the high indebtedness of 
firms is not simply related to the old development model, on the 
other hand, it cannot be reduced to the absence of developed and 
well-functioning capital markets. Therefore a policy aimed at 
fostering expansion and efficiency of capital markets may not be 
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Net financing proportions of investment 1980-1997. 
 
 
   of  loans  stse  ltse  gl es tc ftc di  ofdc  misc  stocks 
Stat. 
adjust. total 
1980  33.1  36.5 3.8 8.4 3.7 5.6  -0.9  0  0  20.1  -10.1 7.9  -6.7  101.3 
1981  36.2  31.1 6.3  10.1 4.5 6.7  -8.6  0  0 5.9 5.7 6.7  -5.1  99.6 
1982  43.2  35.9 4.4  15.7 2.7 4.9  -8.5  0  0  -1.4 4.3 3.7  -2.3  102.4 
1983  54.6  24.9  -1.6  10.5 1.8 5.3  -1.7  0  0 3.0  -0.5 7.6  -3.9  100.0 
1984  53.8  31.8 3.5 9.4  -0.1 6.0  -9.2  0  0  -3.0 9.5 6.9  -5.9  102.7 
1985  54.4  35.9 1.8  12.8 0.2 4.0  -9.0  0  0  -8.2 8.4 3.7  -3.8  100.2 
1986  59.7  23.6 4.9 7.6 1.9 3.3  -5.5  0  0  -3.5  -1.9 5.3 2.1  97.7 
1987  63.0  16.3 -1.2  5.5 -0.8  6.5 -3.3  0  0 -1.4  2.3  13.4  1.9  102.1 
1988  67.3  -1.9 4.8 5.7 0.1 4.7  -4.8  0  0 3.9 2.2  21.5  -3.6  100.1 
1989  47.6  17.1  6.6  15.4 -0.2  4.0 -4.7  0  0 -3.3 -1.2  21.2 -0.4  102.1 
1990  39.6  21.5 3.6  23.0  -0.1 3.7  -2.7  0  0 5.9  -1.9  11.9  -1.2  103.2 
1991  39.3  27.7 1.2  26.1 0.3 3.9  -1.8  0  0 3.1  -1.0 9.1 1.0  108.9 
1992  40.7  16.2 8.1  14.7 1.0 2.9  -2.0 3.7  -0.7 1.1  -0.3  10.9 2.3  98.5 
1993  44.6  13.8  12.1  19.1 -0.2  2.9 -2.5  0.9 -0.7 -3.0  3.1  15.0 -2.3  102.9 
1994  41.7  27.0 4.8  17.5 0.3 2.4  -2.7 2.2  -1.3 1.3  -1.5  15.8  -2.8  104.7 
1995  39.8  14.0  11.3  17.5 0.2 3.4  -3.2 2.2  -1.5 2.1 6.0  11.3  -0.7  102.5 
1996  33.8  13.7  16.2  23.3  -0.2 0.8  -1.2 3.5  -1.5 3.1 3.1 9.1  -0.9  102.7 





of = own financing 
stse= short term securities 
ltse= long term securities 
gl= government loans 
es= equity other than stocks 
tc=trade credit 
ftc=foreign trade credit 
di= direct investment 
ofdc= other foreign claims and debts 
misc=miscellanea 




Note: The data reported in this table are own calculations 
based on the Flow of Funds Total of Financial and 
Nonfinancial Transactions Business Sector issued yearly by 
The Bank of Korea. 
The Flow of Funds data were also available at the website of 
the Bank of Korea, http://www.bok.or.kr, at the time this work 
was being done.                                                                                      